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_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
With the evolution of managed healthcare and the 
advent of provider networks and other cost-control 
mechanisms, many insurers in recent years have incorporated 
into their health insurance plans clauses that purport to bar 
insureds from assigning their claims to any third party—even 
the healthcare provider that rendered the service.  This appeal 
presents the question whether such “anti-assignment clauses” 
are enforceable, or whether, as argued by the healthcare 
provider in this case whose claim was dismissed for lack of 
standing, they are antithetical to the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (“ERISA”) and to public policy.  For the 
reasons that follow, we conclude that anti-assignment clauses 
in ERISA-governed health insurance plans are enforceable, 
and we will therefore affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
 
I. Factual and Procedural History 
In October 2015, Appellant American Orthopedic and 
Sports Medicine performed shoulder surgery on “Joshua,” a 
patient who was covered by a health insurance plan issued by 
Appellees (the “Insurers”).1   
                                              
1 The Insurers are Independence Blue Cross Blue 
Shield and Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey, 
both of which are licensees of the Blue Cross Blue Shield 
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After the surgery, Appellant charged Joshua for the 
procedure.  Because Appellant did not participate in the 
Insurers’ network, it was not limited to the fee schedule 
prescribed by the Insurers.  Instead, it charged Joshua a total 
of $58,400 and submitted a claim in that amount to the 
Insurers on Joshua’s behalf.  The claim form identified the 
various medical services rendered to Joshua and indicated 
that he had “authorize[d] payment of medical benefits” to 
Appellant.  J.A. 38.  As Appellant’s charges far exceeded the 
plan’s allowed reimbursement, the Insurers responded by 
processing Joshua’s claim according to its out-of-network cap 
of $2,633, applying his deductible of $2,000 and his 50% 
coinsurance of $316, issuing him a small reimbursement 
check for the remaining $316, and informing him that he 
would still owe Appellant the remaining $58,083. 
 
Dissatisfied, Appellant appealed its claim through the 
Insurers’ internal administrative process.  At the same time, it 
arranged for Joshua to sign a document entitled “Assignment 
of Benefits & Ltd. Power of Attorney,” which reflected that 
Joshua was assigning to Appellant his right to pursue claims 
under his health insurance plan for the surgery and, in the 
alternative, that he granted to Appellant a limited power of 
attorney to recover the payment on his behalf through an 
arbitration or lawsuit.  J.A. 36.  After the Insurers apparently 
denied the appeal, Appellant sued them in New Jersey state 
court for violations of ERISA and its implementing 
regulations, and for breach of contract.  At that point, the 
                                                                                                     
Association.  Joshua’s plan was issued by an Independence 
affiliate, but Appellant initially submitted its reimbursement 
claim to Independence via Horizon.  
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Insurers removed the suit to federal court and moved to 
dismiss, pointing out that Joshua’s insurance plan included an 
anti-assignment clause that stated, “[t]he right of a Member to 
receive benefit payments under this Program is personal to 
the Member and is not assignable in whole or in part to any 
person, Hospital, or other entity,” Independence Response to 
Court Letter *90 (filed Nov. 10, 2017) (emphasis added),2 
and arguing that Appellant therefore lacked standing to sue.  
The District Court agreed and dismissed Appellant’s 
complaint, and this appeal followed. 
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
exercise plenary review over a District Court’s decision to 
dismiss for lack of standing.  Leuthner v. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield of Ne. Pa., 454 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 2006).  To the 
extent that the Insurers “contest[] the sufficiency of the 
                                              
2 In full, the anti-assignment clause read: 
 Assignment of Benefit to Providers 
The right of a Member to receive benefit 
payments under this Program is personal to the 
Member and is not assignable in whole or in 
part to any person, Hospital, or other entity nor 
may benefits of this Program be transferred, 
either before or after Covered Services are 
rendered.  However, a Member can assign 
benefit payments to the custodial parent of a 
Dependent covered under this Program, as 
required by law. 
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pleadings,” we “only consider the allegations of the complaint 
and documents referenced therein” and we do so “in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff.”  In re Schering Plough Corp. 
Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 
(3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 
220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000)).     
III. Discussion 
Appellant contends it has standing to sue here, first, 
because anti-assignment clauses in ERISA-governed health 
insurance contracts are unenforceable against healthcare 
providers and, second, because even if those clauses are 
enforceable, the Insurers waived their right to enforce it in 
this case.  If we conclude the anti-assignment clause here is 
enforceable against healthcare providers, Appellant raises a 
third argument in the alternative, i.e., that we should remand 
to allow it an opportunity to correct the deficiencies in 
Joshua’s Power of Attorney and pursue Joshua’s claims on 
his behalf in an agency capacity.  We address these arguments 
in turn.   
 A. Enforceability of Anti-Assignment Clauses 
 The parties stake out opposing views on the 
enforceability of anti-assignment clauses, grounding their 
positions in ERISA’s text, congressional policy, and 
persuasive authority from other Courts of Appeals.  For the 
reasons explained below, we conclude that none justify a 
departure from the general rule that courts will enforce the 
terms of an agreement that was freely negotiated between 
contracting parties. 
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 i. ERISA’s Text 
ERISA is a “comprehensive legislative scheme” 
designed to “protect . . . the interests of participants in 
employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries,” Aetna Health 
Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (internal quotation 
marks omitted), and to do so provides for a variety of 
standards and regulations for both “pension plans” and 
“welfare plans,” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), (2); see also N.Y. State 
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers 
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 650-51 (1995).  The latter category 
includes health insurance plans, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), and 
ERISA provides employees covered by such plans with the 
right to sue to “recover benefits due . . . under the terms of 
[the] plan,” id. § 1132(a)(1)(B).  That right, however, is 
limited to the “participant” or “beneficiary” under the plan, 
id. § 1132(a)(1), with those terms limited respectively to 
employees, current or former, eligible to receive benefits 
under a covered plan, id. § 1002(7), and to persons designated 
by a participant or the terms of the plan to receive some 
benefit from the plan, id. § 1002(8).3  Although a healthcare 
                                              
3 In full, ERISA defines a “participant” as:  
[A]ny employee or former employee of an 
employer, or any member or former member of 
an employee organization, who is or may 
become eligible to receive a benefit of any type 
from an employee benefit plan which covers 
employees of such employer or members of 
such organization, or whose beneficiaries may 
be eligible to receive any such benefit.   
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provider does not fall into either category, see Pascack Valley 
Hosp. v. Local 464A UFCW Welfare Reimbursement Plan, 
388 F.3d 393, 400 (3d Cir. 2004), we held in North Jersey 
Brain & Spine Center v. Aetna, Inc., 801 F.3d 369 (3d Cir. 
2015) (hereinafter “NJBSC”), that a valid assignment of 
benefits by a plan participant or beneficiary transfers to such 
a provider both the insured’s right to payment under a plan 
and his right to sue for that payment, id. at 372. 
Appellant argues that because we interpreted ERISA in 
NJBSC to allow for the assignment of benefits, we should 
now hold that such assignments also may not be disallowed.  
But in NJBSC we merely held—in the absence of an anti-
assignment clause—that “when a patient assigns payment of 
insurance benefits to a healthcare provider, [the] provider 
gains standing to sue for that payment.”  Id.  We had no 
occasion to address the effect or enforceability of an anti-
assignment clause, and thus, despite Appellant’s heavy 
reliance on that case, it has little bearing here.  
 
The Insurers, on the other hand, posit that if Congress 
had intended to prohibit anti-assignment clauses in ERISA-
governed health insurance plans, it would have done so 
explicitly, just as it did in the pension plan context.4  And, 
                                                                                                     
29 U.S.C. § 1002(7).  And ERISA defines a “beneficiary” as:  
“[A] person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an 
employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a 
benefit thereunder.”  Id. § 1002(8). 
4 ERISA states that “[e]ach pension plan shall provide 
that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or 
alienated.”  29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1).   
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notably, as anti-assignment clauses have become an 
increasingly prominent feature of health insurance contracts 
in more recent years, Congress also has had ample 
opportunity to mandate assignability if indeed that were its 
intent.  Yet despite repeated amendments and a largescale 
overhaul of the healthcare system via the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010), it has not done so. 
 
In addition, the Insurers highlight the Supreme Court’s 
observation in Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & 
Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988), that “[Congress] had 
before it a provision to bar the alienation . . . of ERISA plan 
benefits, and chose to impose that limitation only with respect 
to ERISA pension benefit plans, and not ERISA welfare 
benefit plans.  In a comprehensive regulatory scheme like 
ERISA, such omissions are significant ones.”  Id. at 837.  
Some Courts of Appeals have concluded, based in part on that 
language from Mackey, that Congress’ silence on 
assignability of welfare benefits means anti-assignment 
clauses in the health insurance context must be enforceable.  
See, e.g., Davidowitz v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc., 946 
F.2d 1476, 1480-81 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Congress carefully 
considered assignment of both pension and welfare plan 
benefits, and consciously decided to prohibit pension plan 
assignments but remain silent on welfare benefits . . . . 
Congress intended not to mandate assignability.”); Ark. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary’s Hosp., Inc., 947 F.2d 1341, 
1349 (8th Cir. 1991) (“If Congress intended that a mandatory 
rule govern the assignment of welfare benefits, it could have 
easily provided for such a rule, as it did in the case of pension 
benefits.”). 
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We find Mackey less instructive than our Sister 
Circuits.  The absence of statutory language prohibiting 
assignment in the welfare context may indicate that Congress 
intended to preserve the rights of individual plan beneficiaries 
to assign their benefits.  But that silence does not necessarily 
mean Congress intended to permit plan trustees to extinguish 
those rights for all beneficiaries through a blanket contractual 
waiver.  In fact, two considerations point the other way.  First, 
the Supreme Court in Mackey emphasized that Congress’ 
intent in “bar[ring] the alienation” of pension benefits was to 
protect pensioners.  486 U.S. at 837.  Yet while prohibiting 
assignment in the pension context “ensure[s] that the 
employee’s accrued benefits are actually available for 
retirement purposes,” H.R. Rep. No. 93-807, at 68 (1974), 
prohibiting assignment in the health insurance context, as 
Appellant argues, could disadvantage patients with shorter-
term needs, limit patient choices, and eventually reduce out-
of-network providers’ market share.  Second, unlike in the 
pension context, assignment of plan benefits has been “fairly 
ubiquitous” in the health insurance context—particularly 
assignment of claims to the service provider that performed 
the service for which the claim is being submitted.  Gregory 
F. Jacob, Provider “Standing” Wars Continue, 24 No. 3 
ERISA Litig. Rep., Sept. 2016, at 4.  Thus, Congress may 
have intended a continuation of the status quo and simply 
perceived no need to state expressly that insureds retained a 
right to assign their benefits to their service providers. 
 
In short, the text of ERISA, even with the 
interpretations in NJBSC and Mackey, is inconclusive on the 
question we address today. 
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 ii. Congressional Policy 
Because ERISA does not clearly prohibit anti-
assignment clauses, we confront a statutory gap yet to be 
filled.  And when it comes to ERISA, “it is well settled that 
Congress intended that the federal courts would fill in [such] 
gaps by developing, in light of reason, experience, and 
common sense, a federal common law of rights and 
obligations imposed by the statute.”  Teamsters Pension Tr. 
Fund of Phila. & Vicinity v. Littlejohn, 155 F.3d 206, 208 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 
(1996)).  To do so, we “look to the provisions of the whole 
law, and to its object and policy.”  Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. 
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987) (quoting Kelly v. Robinson, 
479 U.S. 36, 43 (1986)).  As relevant here, Congress has 
explained that “the policy of [ERISA is] to protect . . . the 
interests of participants in employee benefit plans,” 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1001(b), and we have previously observed that participants’ 
interests are served by “increasing their access to care,” 
CardioNet, Inc. v. Cigna Health Corp., 751 F.3d 165, 179 (3d 
Cir. 2014); cf. IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Barker & 
Williamson, Inc., 788 F.2d 118, 127 (3d Cir. 1986) (“Courts 
have indicated that because ERISA” is a “remedial statute[]” 
it “should be liberally construed in favor of protecting the 
participants in employee benefit plans.” (citations omitted)).   
With those interests in mind, the parties each urge that 
plausible policy considerations support their respective 
positions.  Appellant construes “access to care” narrowly, 
focusing on whether individual patients’ choices are limited, 
and arguing that enforcing anti-assignment clauses creates 
incentives for providers not to serve out-of-network patients 
with such clauses in their plans because providers will have 
no remedy for nonpayment other than to sue patients—a 
12 
 
proposition that is both expensive and bad for business.  And 
eventually, Appellant asserts, the widespread use of anti-
assignment clauses will drive out-of-network providers out of 
business entirely, reducing the choices available to patients.  
That is because instead of being able to recover directly from 
the insurer, out-of-network providers will be forced to rely on 
the patient to recover from that insurer before seeking 
payment, in turn, from the patient, with each step along the 
way adding to the risk of default.  Just as we held that “escape 
clauses”5 in ERISA-governed plans were unenforceable 
because they violated the policies underlying ERISA, Ne. 
Dep’t ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local 
Union No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147, 164 (3d Cir. 
1985), so too, Appellant urges, we should conclude these 
negative policy consequences invalidate anti-assignment 
clauses.6   
                                              
5 “Escape clauses” are provisions “through which [a] 
plan attempts to escape all liability if a participant or 
beneficiary is covered by another plan, regardless of the level 
of benefits provided by the other plan.”  Ne. Dep’t ILGWU 
Health & Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local Union No. 229 
Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147, 149-50 (3d Cir. 1985). 
6 Appellant separately argues that anti-assignment 
clauses reduce patient access to care because they allow 
insurers to “easily circumvent . . . assignments by burying an 
anti-assignment in a voluminous healthcare plan” that neither 
the patient nor the healthcare provider is likely to read in its 
entirety.  Appellant’s Br. 13.  But the mere potential for abuse 
is not a reason to hold anti-assignment clauses categorically 
unenforceable, particularly given the availability of traditional 
contract defenses, such as fraud, misrepresentation, and 
13 
 
The Insurers, on the other hand, contend that anti-
assignment clauses further Congress’ related but broader goal 
in ERISA of “maintaining premium costs at a reasonable 
level,” Horizon Br. 27 (citing Klund v. High Tech. Sols., Inc., 
417 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1159 (S.D. Cal. 2005)), and in the 
process, of making health insurance, and ultimately 
healthcare itself, more accessible to patients.  That is because 
larger insurance networks can use their market power to cap 
the amount that healthcare providers can charge for their 
services, and anti-assignment clauses strengthen those 
networks by encouraging providers to join and by protecting 
insurers from exorbitant demands for reimbursement—a 
proposition accepted by a variety of federal and state courts.7  
                                                                                                     
unconscionability.  See, e.g., Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 
916 F.2d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 1990) (“If a clause really is buried 
in illegible ‘fine print’—or if . . . it plainly is neither intended 
nor likely to be read by the other party—this circumstance 
may support an inference of fraud.”).  And here, in any event, 
there was no burying: The anti-assignment provision appears 
on the “Introduction” page of the contract.   
 
7 Despite the facial appeal of the argument that anti-
assignment clauses help control the rates charged by out-of-
network providers, there is room for skepticism, as most 
insurance plans already cap out-of-network reimbursement, 
with the plan here a case in point: Although the Insurers make 
much of Appellant charging $58,400 for a procedure that they 
reimburse at only $2,633, describing it as “unconstrained” 
and “a proverbial ‘fox running the henhouse’ scenario,” 
Horizon Br. 34, the Insurers fail to show how assignment of 
the claim would expose them to additional liability beyond 
the $2,633 cap.   
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See, e.g., St. Mary’s, 947 F.2d at 1348; Somerset Orthopedic 
Assocs., P.A. v. Horizon Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., 
785 A.2d 457, 463-64 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).   
 
Yet the parties’ respective policy arguments are only 
as persuasive as the empirical data that support them, and 
neither party cites to authoritative empirical data.  Instead, 
they would have us deduce whether anti-assignment clauses 
promote or impede the goals of ERISA on the basis of their 
dueling economic arguments and without pointing us to any 
congressional findings or hearings on the subject.  This we 
decline to do, respecting that Congress is far better positioned 
to gather data, solicit and respond to the views of its 
constituents, and craft a solution that takes such policy 
considerations into account.  Thus, “[w]here a legislature has 
significantly greater institutional expertise . . . the Court in 
practice defers to empirical legislative judgments,” Nixon v. 
Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., 
concurring).   
 
As the parties’ policy arguments do little to tip the 
scales, we turn to the out-of-Circuit authority on which they 
rely. 
 
 iii. The Other Courts of Appeals 
Although neither ERISA’s text nor policy point 
decidedly in one direction, persuasive authority from our 
Sister Circuits does.  In thoughtful and reasoned decisions, 
every Circuit to have considered the arguments presented by 
Appellant has rejected them, ultimately concluding that 
nothing in ERISA forecloses plan administrators from freely 
negotiating anti-assignment clauses, among other terms.  See 
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McCulloch Orthopaedic Surgical Servs., PLLC v. Aetna Inc., 
857 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2017); Physicians Multispeciality 
Grp. v. Health Care Plan of Horton Homes, Inc., 371 F.3d 
1291, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2004); LeTourneau Lifelike 
Orthotics & Prosthetics, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, 298 F.3d 
348, 352 (5th Cir. 2002); City of Hope Nat’l Med. Ctr. v. 
HealthPlus, Inc., 156 F.3d 223, 228-29 (1st Cir. 1998); St. 
Francis Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., 
Inc., 49 F.3d 1460, 1465 (10th Cir. 1995); Davidowitz, 946 
F.2d at 1479-81.     
 As purportedly contrary authority, Appellant directs us 
to Hermann Hospital v. MEBA Medical & Benefits Plan, 959 
F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1992), where the Fifth Circuit interpreted 
an anti-assignment clause “as applying only to unrelated, 
third-party assignees—other than the health care provider of 
assigned benefits” because it read that particular anti-
assignment clause as “clearly intended to prevent . . . 
assignment of payments under the Plan to . . . creditors . . . 
which have no relationship to the providing of covered 
benefits.”  Id. at 575.  But in a subsequent decision, the court 
clarified that it had declined to enforce the anti-assignment 
clause in Hermann only because the clause there did not, by 
its terms, cover healthcare providers and, consistent with the 
other Courts of Appeals, it viewed explicit anti-assignment 
clauses as enforceable.  LeTourneau, 298 F.3d at 351-52. 
 
 In sum, we perceive no compelling reason to stray 
from the “black-letter law that the terms of an unambiguous 
private contract must be enforced.”  Travelers Indem. Co. v. 
Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 150 (2009); see also In re Kaplan, 143 
F.3d 807, 818 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Parties are entitled to enforce 
the terms of negotiated contracts[.]” (quoting RTC v. 
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Holtzman, 618 N.E.2d 418, 424 (Ill. 1993))).  We are left with 
a gap in the text, reasonable and competing policy arguments 
that lack grounding in legislative fact finding, and an 
overwhelming consensus among the Courts of Appeals that 
“ERISA leaves the assignability or non-assignability of health 
care benefits under ERISA-regulated welfare plans to the 
negotiations of the contracting parties.”  City of Hope, 156 
F.3d at 229.  We now join that consensus and hold that anti-
assignment clauses in ERISA-governed health insurance 
plans as a general matter are enforceable.   
 
B. Waiver 
Even assuming that an anti-assignment clause is 
generally enforceable, Appellant argues that the Insurers 
waived their right to enforce it because they accepted and 
processed the claim form, issued a check to Joshua, and failed 
to raise the anti-assignment clause as an affirmative defense 
during the internal administrative appeals process.  We are 
not persuaded. 
Under applicable state law,8 a waiver requires a “clear, 
unequivocal and decisive act of the party with knowledge of 
such right and an evident purpose to surrender it,” Brown v. 
City of Pittsburgh, 186 A.2d 399, 401 (Pa. 1962), and routine 
processing of a claim form, issuing payment at the out-of-
network rate, and summarily denying the informal appeal do 
                                              
8 Although Appellant initially argued on appeal that 
we should apply New Jersey law, as opposed to Pennsylvania 
law, it has since acknowledged that Joshua’s insurance plan 
included an unambiguous Pennsylvania choice-of-law 
provision.  
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not demonstrate “an evident purpose to surrender” an 
objection to a provider’s standing in a federal lawsuit, see, 
e.g., Emami v. Quinteles IMS, No. 17-3069, 2017 WL 
4220329, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 21, 2017) (holding that “dealing 
directly with the [m]edical [p]rovider in the claim review 
process[] or . . . directly remitting payment to the [m]edical 
[p]rovider” did not constitute a waiver); Shah v. Blue Cross 
Blue Shield of Ala., No. 17-700, 2017 WL 4182043, at *3 
(D.N.J. Sept. 21, 2017) (stating that “direct payment to a 
patient or healthcare provider does not constitute waiver of an 
anti-assignment provision where the plan at issue authorizes 
such payment”); Cohen v. Indep. Blue Cross, 820 F. Supp. 2d 
594, 606-07 (D.N.J. 2011) (holding that allegations that an 
insurer made direct payments to an insured and ignored a 
healthcare provider’s appeal did not constitute a waiver).  See 
J.A. 58 (indicating that Outpatient Ambulatory Surgical 
Center services are reimbursed to out-of-network providers at 
50%, after deductible); J.A. 36, 40.   
 
C. Power of Attorney 
If we reach this point in our analysis, Appellant has 
requested that we nonetheless vacate and remand so that it 
can perfect an alternative basis for standing: the power of 
attorney that it acknowledges was deficient under applicable 
state law.  Appellant Suppl. Letter Br. 1 (Nov. 7, 2017); see 
also Oral Arg. at 8:30 (“[T]he technical requirements are not 
there.”).9  The Insurers, for their part, argue that remand 
                                              
9 Although Joshua’s health insurance plan contained a 
Pennsylvania choice-of-law provision that governed the 
interpretation and application of the plan’s anti-assignment 
clause, see supra note 8, that provision does not address the 
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would be futile because “[a]n anti-assignment clause 
encompasses and applies to a limited power-of-attorney . . . 
just as forcefully as it applies to a general ‘assignment,’” 
Horizon Suppl. Letter Br. 1 (Nov. 7, 2017), and because 
“there is no appreciable distinction between” assignments and 
powers of attorney, id. at 3.     
The Insurers are mistaken.  Assignments and powers 
of attorney differ in important respects with distinct 
consequences for the power of a plan trustee to contractually 
bind an insured.  An assignment purports to transfer 
ownership of a claim to the assignee, giving it standing to 
assert those rights and to sue on its own behalf.  See Sprint 
Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 271 
(2008).  Thus, a plan trustee can limit the ability of a 
beneficiary to assign claims because, among the parties’ 
“power to limit the rights created by their agreement,” 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 322 cmt. a (1981), is the 
power to restrict ownership interest to particular holders.  A 
power of attorney, on the other hand, “does not transfer an 
ownership interest in the claim,” W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co. 
v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 549 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 2008), 
but simply confers on the agent the authority to act “on behalf 
                                                                                                     
choice-of-law applicable to a power of attorney.  But we have 
no need to resolve whether Pennsylvania or New Jersey law 
is applicable because Appellant’s power of attorney failed the 
requirement of both laws that there be at least one witness.  
See 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5601(b); N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 46:2B-8.9, 46:14-2.1(b); see generally Hammersmith v. 
TIG Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 220, 229-30 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting 
that choice-of-law analysis is unnecessary where the laws at 
issue do not conflict). 
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of the principal,” In re Complaint of Bankers Tr. Co., 752 
F.2d 874, 881 (3d Cir. 1984).   
 
As these principles apply here, our holding today that 
the anti-assignment clause is enforceable means that Joshua, 
as plan beneficiary, did not transfer the interest in his claim, 
but it does not mean that Joshua cannot grant a valid power of 
attorney.  To the contrary, because he retains ownership of his 
claim, Joshua, as principal, may confer on his agent the 
authority to assert that claim on his behalf, and the anti-
assignment clause no more has power to strip Appellant of its 
ability to act as Joshua’s agent than it does to strip Joshua of 
his own interest in his claim.  See Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 
282, 289-90 (1939) (noting that a power of attorney did not 
“operate as an assignment to vest the attorney with such title 
or interest as will enable him to maintain the suit in his own 
name”); W.R. Huff, 549 F.3d at 108 (concluding that “a mere 
power-of-attorney . . . does not confer standing to sue in the 
holder’s own right,” whereas “an assignment of claims 
transfers legal title or ownership of those claims and thus 
fulfills the constitutional requirement of an ‘injury-in-fact’”).  
Indeed, the Insurers’ argument that anti-assignment clauses 
preclude principals from granting a power of attorney to their 
agents not only lacks support; it also seems particularly ill-
suited for the healthcare context where patients must rely on 
their agents when they anticipate even short-term 
incapacitation after medical procedures, see Powers v. Fultz, 
404 F.2d 50, 51 (7th Cir. 1968), and where those who 
anticipate longer-term unavailability, like deployed service 
members or those suffering from progressive conditions, 
depend on their designated agents to handle their medical 
claims and other affairs in their absence, see, e.g., 
Bartholomew v. Blevins, 679 F.3d 497, 499 (6th Cir. 2012) 
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(deployed service members); Jay E. Hayden Found. v. First 
Neighbor Bank, N.A., 610 F.3d 382, 384 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(incompetent persons). 
 
Accordingly, we reject the Insurers’ contention that the 
presence here of a valid anti-assignment clause renders futile 
any remand for Appellant to perfect its power of attorney.  
Nonetheless, we decline to remand for a different reason: 
Appellant waived its arguments concerning the power of 
attorney by failing to raise them in its opening or reply brief 
and, indeed, did not address the significance of the power of 
attorney until we invited it to do so in supplemental briefing.  
See United States v. Quillen, 335 F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 
2003).    
 
*      *      * 
In sum, anti-assignment clauses in ERISA-governed 
health insurance plans are generally enforceable, the Insurers 
did not waive their objections to Appellant’s standing, and 
Appellant, having waived its argument for a remand to 
perfect the power of attorney, concedes that the power of 
attorney in this record is invalid under state law.  For those 
reasons, the District Court correctly held that Appellant 
lacked standing to proceed in federal court, and we will 
affirm the District Court’s judgment of dismissal. 
